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April 08-09, 2019 | Zurich, Switzerland
2
nd
International Conference on
Green Energy & Technology
Environmental Risk Assessment and Remediation | Volume 3
ISSN: 2529-8046
The Climate Change dilemma: Can unpredictability save us?
Aleksandra M Bašič
Cembra Money Bank AG, Switzerland
T
he climate change is an example of the biggest
social dilemma in the human history. Climate
change mitigation can be successful only if the
whole world will undertake an internationally
coordinated collective action. Evolutionary games
provide a suitable theoretical framework for
studying the challenges of climate change, and
we will build on this fact in the present paper to
study the evolution of cooperation and discuss
its implications for offsetting the temptations
to pollute. It has become clear that tackling the
climate change will be costly, and accordingly,
the temptations to pollute will always be present.
Costs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
can be easily calculated for each individual,
but benefits of the successful reduction will be
distributed among all the “players”, independently
from their actual contributions to sustainable
development. Evolutionary games have recently
been employed successfully to tackle the looming
climate change problem. Build on this fact, we
study the evolution of cooperation and discuss
its implications for offsetting the temptations to
pollute. It has namely become very painfully clear
that tackling the climate change will be definitely
costly, and accordingly, the temptations to pollute
will be always be present. Can the element
of unpredictability increase the probability of
adopting the cleaner strategies? We apply the
spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the
cooperative behaviour is challenged by defection
that promises individuals a higher fitness and is
thus more likely to predominate. Results show
contrast to the real data and indicators of climate
change.
e
:
sandra666.basic@gmail.comEnviron Risk Assess Remediat, Volume 3
DOI: 10.4066/2529-8046-C1-003